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Williams v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 (Oct. 25, 2018)1
CRIMINAL LAW: PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND CONTRIVED SEXUAL ALLEGATIONS BY MINORS
Summary
The Court determined that (1) a district court must perform a comprehensive three-step
analysis when a defendant challenges the use of race in peremptory strikes and that (2) a district
court should hold a hearing when a defendant seeks to admit evidence showing that a minor
victim could have contrived sexual abuse allegations.
Background
Gregory Williams was convicted of six counts of sexual misconduct for sexually assaulting
a minor under the age of 14 and for lewdness with another minor under the age of 14. During jury
selection, the State used a peremptory strike to remove Juror No. 23, a black woman. Williams
made a Batson2 challenge to the removal, arguing that Juror No. 23 was removed due to her race.
The State argued that it dismissed Juror No. 23 for race-neutral reasons. After the State offered its
explanation, the district court immediately decided that the State’s reason was race-neutral. On
appeal, Williams argued that the district court clearly erred in denying his challenge to the State’s
use of a peremptory strike to remove an African-American woman from the venire.
Williams also argued that he should have been allowed to present evidence that the young
girls were able to contrive their allegations because they had been exposed to sexually explicit
information at home. He stated that the district court should have allowed him to question the girls
under oath outside the presence of the jury to ascertain their awareness of their mother’s career in
the adult film industry and their exposure to sexual information at home. This appeal followed.
Discussion
II.
Under Batson v. Kentucky it is unconstitutional to use a peremptory strike to remove a
potential juror based on race. 3 Such discrimination in jury selection constitutes a structural error
that requires reversal.4 In analyzing a Batson challenge, district courts should undertake a threestep inquiry. First, the party opposing the peremptory strike must make a prima facie showing that
the challenge was exercised on the basis of race. Second, the proponent of the strike must present
a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Finally, the Court should hear argument on the issue and
determine whether the opponent of the strike has proven intentional discrimination.
A.
In making its prima facie showing, the party opposing the strike must demonstrate “that
the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”5 The party
opposing the strike can present various forms of evidence including a pattern of discriminatory
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strikes, a disproportionate impact of peremptory strikes, the statements and questions during voir
dire, and whether the case itself is sensitive to bias.6
Here, Williams argued that Juror No. 23 was excluded solely because of her race. Before
Williams was able to make his prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the State asserted
that it had a race-neutral reason for excluding Juror No. 23. Because the State provided a raceneutral reason for its strike before Williams could make his prima facie case, the Court determined
that step one was moot and that it was appropriate to move onto step two.
B.
At step two, the State must provide a race-neutral reason for excluding a potential juror.7
At this point, the district court need only determine that the State has provided an ostensibly raceneutral explanation for the peremptory strike; the district court should not at this point make a final
determination until it has conducted the inquiry required by step three.8
Here, the State explained that it struck the potential juror, a physician’s assistant, because
the juror stated that sometimes “science gets it wrong, even though she’s a doctor.” Additionally,
the State claimed that Juror No. 23 likely would not “deliberate in the group effectively,” that she
“was closed off,” and “her answers were short, [and] she was unwilling to communicate much
more than yes or no answers.” The Court concluded that these race-neutral explanations satisfied
the State’s burden at step two.
C.
In step three, the district court must determine whether the defendant has proven purposeful
discrimination.9 The district court “must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and
direct evidence of intent as may be available’ and consider all relevant circumstances” before
dismissing the challenged juror.10 The district court should sustain the Batson challenge when it is
“more likely than not that the challenge was improperly motivated.”11
Here, the district court failed to follow the proper procedures. Upon hearing the State’s
ostensibly race-neutral explanation for dismissing Juror No. 23, the district court immediately
made its final determination, stating “I find it was race-neutral. I don’t think it was because of race,
but I also noticed that you, [defense counsel], kicked an African American lady off first.” After
the district court made this determination, Williams asked for an opportunity to respond to the
State’s race-neutral explanation. The Court found that Williams should not have needed to ask the
district court to perform step three of the Batson analysis. The Court found that the district court
never conducted the sensitive inquiry required by step three.
District courts are usually granted significant deference in exercising their discretion on a
Batson challenge because the district court is able to assess the demeanor of the prosecutor and the
prospective juror. But in this case only part of the basis for the peremptory strike involved the
demeanor of the struck juror, and the district court summarily denied the Batson challenge without
making a factual finding regarding the juror’s demeanor. The Court thus concluded that there was
no basis to find that the district court based its denial on the State’s demeanor argument.
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The Court further concluded that the State’s argument that it dismissed Juror No. 23
because she expressed skepticism about science appeared pretextual. During voir dire, Juror No.
23 acknowledged that sometimes “science gets it wrong” and that the results of a test using
technology can be incorrect. Several other jurors also expressed doubts about science and were not
struck. The Court concluded that the State’s failure to follow up with questions for Juror No. 23,
or to strike the other jurors who expressed similar skepticism, suggested that the State’s raceneutral explanation for dismissing Juror No. 23 was pretextual.
The Court found that without a factual finding from the district court, the record did not
support the State’s demeanor argument. In fact, the information in the record regarding the
demeanor of Juror No. 23 seemed to contradict the State’s assertions. While the State argued that
Juror No. 23 was “closed off” and only gave short answers, the Court found that she gave longer
answers when appropriate and displayed a sense of humor. The Court found that the record
provided no evidence to support the State’s assertion that Juror No. 23 would not deliberate
effectively in a group.
The Court acknowledged the considerable human, economic, and social costs of a reversal
and retrial. However, given the district court’s mishandling of Williams’s Batson challenge and
the pretextual nature of at least part of the State’s race-neutral explanation for striking Juror No.
23, the district court clearly erred in denying Williams’s Batson challenge. Because this was a
structural error, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.
III.
The Court next turned to the issue of the procedure for admitting or excluding evidence to
show that the minor victims had the knowledge to contrive sexual abuse allegations. Williams
wished to present evidence showing that the girls knew enough about sex to have fabricated their
allegations. Williams specifically wished to admit evidence of the fact that the girls’ mother sold
adult toys and performed in adult films. Despite the statement of one of the girls that her mother
was a “porn star” and a statement from the other girl that she had viewed pornography, the State
argued that there was no evidence the girls knew about their mother’s career.
The district court initially scheduled a hearing to determine what the girls knew about their
mother’s career but cancelled it after defense counsel interviewed the girls at their school without
their mother’s permission. Williams refiled his motion twelve days before the trial, and the district
court denied it, stating that the evidence lacked relevance unless the State first opened the door by
arguing that the girls were sexually innocent and incapable of making up their story. The Court
found this ruling to be an error.
A defendant may show that an alleged victim has experienced incidents of sexual conduct
and thus has the ability to contrive sexual allegations.12 Williams’s theory of defense was that the
girls fabricated their allegations against him because they wanted to get him out of their house.
Williams wanted to rebut the assumption that a ten and twelve-year-old girl were too sexually
innocent to describe the sexual acts they accused Williams of performing. The district court erred
by categorically excluding evidence of the girls’ mother’s sexual activities because there is no
requirement that the State open the door for Williams to present such evidence.
The fact that the girls were exposed to pornography makes it more likely that they would
be able to contrive sexual allegations. Williams sought to introduce evidence to show the girls’
knowledge of sexual acts, not to attack their character or their mother’s character. While it is
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possible that the potential prejudice for such evidence would outweigh its probative value, the
district court should have weighed the probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice.
When a defendant moves to admit evidence to show that a young victim has the knowledge to
contrive sexual allegations, a district court should give the defendant an opportunity to show that
"due process requires the admission of such evidence because the probative value in the context
of that particular case outweighs its prejudicial effect on the [victim]."13
When offering evidence to show that a young victim had the knowledge to contrive sexual
allegations, courts should follow the standard from Guitron v. State.14 The defendant must first
make an offer of proof regarding the evidence he wishes to admit. The district court should then
hold a hearing in which the defendant presents justification for admitting the evidence. The State
should then have the opportunity to show the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value
of the evidence. The State should look at “whether the introduction of the victim's past sexual
conduct may confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an
improper emotional basis.”15 On remand, the district court should engage in the appropriate
analysis to determine whether Williams should be allowed to present the evidence that the girls
had the knowledge to contrive sexual allegations against him.
Conclusion
The Court determined that the district court erred by denying Williams’s Batson challenge
and in excluding evidence that the girls had the knowledge to contrive their allegations against
Williams. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to
the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
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